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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the state of discretionary fiscal policy. Among its findings are:
(1) In recent years, U.S. discretionary fiscal policy appears to have become more active in response to
both cyclical conditions and a simple measure of budget balance.
(2) Considerable uncertainty remains about how large an impact discretionary fiscal policy has on output.
(3) There is little evidence that discretionary fiscal policy has played an important stabilization role during
recent decades.
(4) Budgetary pressure may weaken the efficacy of expansionary fiscal policy. Conversely,
contractionary fiscal policy might have a salutary effect on output. This possibility may be relevant for
understanding the impact of fiscal policy in the 1990s, although the mechanism is unclear.
(5) The automatic stabilizers embedded in the fiscal system have experienced little net change since the
1960s and have contributed to cushioning cyclical fluctuations. But the tax system has many attributes
that weaken its potential role as an automatic stabilizer, particularly with respect to investment.
(6) The government's reported fiscal position, to which fiscal policy appears responsive, represents a very
poor measure of underlying fiscal balance.
Alan J. Auerbach
Department of Economics
549 Evans Hall, #3880
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA  94720-3880
and NBER
auerbach@econ.berkeley.eduIntroduction 
On March 9, 2002, President Bush signed the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act.  
The Act included a temporary increase in depreciation allowances for business spending on 
equipment and software, in the form of 30 percent partial expensing, and a temporary extension 
of unemployment benefits.  At the time, the motivation of the Act was that it would provide 
fiscal stimulus that could help the economy recover from the first recession in a decade.  Yet, 
whether the economy was still officially in recession at the time was not known, because the 
NBER dating of the recession trough had not yet occurred.  Indeed, there was a clear possibility 
that the recession might be over.  On February 28, the Bureau of Economic Analysis had 
released ￿preliminary￿ estimates showing that real GDP had grown at an annual rate of 1.4 
percent in the fourth quarter of 2001, following a real decline of 1.3 percent in the third quarter, a 
decline substantially associated with the economic disruptions caused by the September 11 
attacks.  This preliminary estimate updated the ￿advance￿ estimate of 0.2 percent fourth quarter 
growth released January 30
1. 
The difficulty of practicing countercyclical fiscal policy has been a staple of 
macroeconomics textbooks for decades.  With the typical postwar recession lasting less than a 
year and discretionary fiscal changes subject to information, political and economic lags, 
knowledgeable policy makers have understood the daunting task they faced.  But the strong 
support for this most recent ￿stimulus package￿ reminds us that policy makers may go where 
economists fear to tread.  No politician wishes to be cast in the title role of It￿s the Economy, 
Stupid. 
                                                 
1 The fourth-quarter 2001 growth rate was again revised upward, to 1.7 percent, when its ￿final￿ estimate was 
released on March 28.  A month later, an advance first-quarter 2002 growth estimate of 5.8 percent was issued.  As 
of this writing, both of these numbers have already been revised again.   2
Even as the practice of countercyclical fiscal policy has survived, the period since the 
golden days of ￿fine tuning￿ has provided further caveats about its use, dating from Lucas￿ 
celebrated critique in the 1970s, emphasizing that activist policy must take account of its effects 
on the expectations of firms and households, to the more recent argument that tax cuts may fail 
to be expansionary in circumstances of budgetary duress.  With the recent recession and 
legislative action, it is a good time to review the state of discretionary fiscal policy, considering 
the extent of its use, its successes and failures, and the extent to which alternative policies have 
been or might be available.  Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey, I consider several 
of the issues that have arisen recently in consideration of the efficacy of fiscal policy. 
How Active Has U.S. Fiscal Policy Been in Recent Decades? 
  In embarking on a study of U.S. discretionary fiscal policy, it makes sense to ask how 
active policy has been, and whether the degree of activism has changed over the years.  While 
these are simple and straightforward questions, their answers are not.  One cannot simply look at 
quarterly or annual changes in federal taxes and spending. 
Cyclical Adjustment 
  The most obvious problem with looking at fluctuations in tax revenues, spending, or their 
difference￿the budget surplus￿is that each of these aggregates￿especially tax revenues￿is 
sensitive to the economic cycle.  Changes occur without any active policy decisions.  Indeed, as 
discussed further below, these changes may serve as automatic stabilizers, but they need to be 
left aside in attempting to measure active policy changes. 
  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) computes a cyclically adjusted, quarterly 
measure of the federal budget surplus, based on the National Income and Product Account   3
(NIPA) seasonally adjusted quarterly surplus measure.
2  This ￿full-employment￿ surplus series, 
available from the first quarter of 1956, provides a measure of how policy has changed at the 
quarterly frequency; it is helpful to examine fiscal behavior at this frequency in studying 
countercyclical policy, given that the period of the typical recession is less than one year.
3 
  Table 1 presents regressions relating the change in the full-employment budget surplus to 
the lagged measure of the full-employment GDP gap, with both measures divided by the level of 
full-employment GDP.  The first column presents the simple regression relating these two 
variables over the full sample period.  The negative coefficient indicates that the full-
employment surplus has fallen in response to a rise in the GDP gap, consistent with the use of 
discretionary countercyclical fiscal policy.  The relationship, however, is weak and not 
statistically significant.  But there are, of course, other determinants of fiscal policy.  As many 
authors have emphasized
4, U.S. fiscal policy over the years has had the property that increased 
levels of national debt lead to higher subsequent budget surpluses.  In first differences, this 
implies that a higher deficit in the past should cause a tightening of policy￿an increase in the 
current surplus.  Adding the lagged budget surplus to the regression, in the second column of 
Table 1, confirms this prediction.  The higher is the lagged budget surplus, the larger is the fall in 
the current full-employment surplus.  This relationship is statistically significant; so too, now, is 
the effect of the lagged output gap. 
  Has the responsiveness of policy to the cycle and to the degree of fiscal balance changed 
over time? The final three columns of Table 1 address this question by repeating the estimation 
                                                 
2 In addition, there is an adjustment that removes the NIPA effect of the allied contributions for Operation Desert 
Storm.  I am grateful to Frank Russek of CBO for making these unpublished data available and explaining their 
construction. 
3 The NIPA measure of the budget deficit differs from that actually used in the Federal budget, but there is no 
quarterly measure of the latter available. 
4 See, for example, Bohn (1998).   4
of column 2 for three subsamples.  Column 5 covers the period since the second quarter of 1993, 
roughly corresponding to the beginning of the Clinton Administration.  Column 4 covers a 
period of equal length immediately preceding this, and column 3 covers the balance of the 
sample period, through the second quarter of 1984.  For this initial period, the relationship is 
comparable to that of the full period shown in column 2.  For the subperiod extending from 1984 
to 1993, though, the estimates indicate that policy was more responsive both to the cycle and to 
the prior budget surplus.  The sensitivity to the surplus, in particular, shows a marked increase 
during this period that followed the large Reagan tax cuts phased in beginning in 1981 that, 
along with the contemporaneous defense build-up and other factors, led to a sharp expansion in 
national debt and deficits relative to GDP.  During the final period, covering the Clinton years 
and the beginning of the current Bush administration, the influence of the budget surplus and, 
especially, the output gap, increases again.  The coefficient on the output gap predicts that the 
full-employment surplus falls by over a third of the previous quarter￿s output gap. 
  To put this last coefficient estimate in context, consider the implied effect of an increase 
of one percentage point in the unemployment rate.  Based on the recent Okun￿s law relationship, 
this implies a roughly 2 percent drop in output relative to its full-employment level.  The 
coefficient of -.358 on the output gap implies a corresponding rise in the full-employment deficit 
of -.72 percent in the next quarter￿about $75 billion on an annual basis at the current level of 
GDP. 
  In summary, based on the estimates in Table 1, U.S. fiscal policy, as measured by 
changes in the full-employment deficit, appears to have been responsive to both cyclical and 
budgetary conditions, with the sensitivity to each factor increasing over time.   5
Timing and Measurement of Response 
  Even purged of automatic cyclical changes in revenues and spending, there are a number 
of reasons why the current full-employment deficit may not offer an ideal measure of the state of 
fiscal policy.  First, there may be changes occurring over time that have nothing to do with 
policy actions.  For example, increasing dispersion of the income distribution, as occurred during 
the 1980s and 1990s, led to increased tax revenues through the progressivity of the individual 
income tax.  To the extent that such changes occur smoothly over time, they will be picked up by 
the constant in Table 1￿s regression model, but their patterns may be more complex than this.
5 
Second, a change in the full-employment surplus, even if resulting from a policy change, 
is not necessarily due to a contemporaneous policy change.  Several major pieces of tax 
legislation in recent decades have included phase-in provisions that confound interpretation of 
changes in the full-employment deficit.  Consider the sequence of events in the early 1980s.  
After the massive tax cut embodied in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, there were 
smaller but still significant tax increases passed in the years immediately following.  The net 
impact, though, was still a phased reduction in taxes.  As the 1981 legislation included tax cut 
provisions that took effect as late as 1985 (when bracket indexation became effective), the net 
changes during the early ￿80s might have appeared expansionary even as restrictive legislation 
was being passed.  A similar situation exists now, as a result of the 2001 passage of the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA).  That legislation￿s provisions 
are scheduled to be phased in over a ten-year period.  Should these future changes occur during 
periods of recession, they might appear to reflect the use of countercyclical discretionary policy 
even though they were enacted long before such conditions existed or were even contemplated. 
                                                 
5 Allowing for nonlinear changes over time, through the addition of a time trend, generally increases the coefficients 
in Table 1, but does not change the picture of sharply increasing sensitivity over time.   6
Finally, as has long been noted, changes in particular components of the surplus￿most 
obviously, changes in spending as opposed to changes in revenues￿should have different effects 
on aggregate demand.  Thus, the change in the deficit, even cyclically adjusted, is inadequate to 
convey the magnitude of stimulus to aggregate demand.  For all three of these reasons￿non-
cyclical autonomous changes, timing, and composition, an alternative measure of fiscal policy, 
based on explicit policy changes, may be preferred.  For this purpose, one may construct a series 
using the periodic fiscal updates published by the CBO. 
  For many years, CBO has provided frequent updates of its baseline revenue and 
expenditure forecasts for the federal budget, covering the current fiscal year and several future 
fiscal years.  With each update, it allocates changes in forecast revenues and expenditures to 
legislative or policy actions, on the one hand, and economic factors on the other (which it breaks 
down further into ￿economic￿￿macroeconomic￿and ￿technical￿ sources, such as those 
associated with shifts in the income distribution).  CBO typically publishes two major revisions 
incorporating updated economic forecasts during each year, the Economic and Budget Outlook in 
late January or early February, and the Economic and Budget Outlook Update during the 
summer.  By accumulating changes between each of these forecasts (including intermediate 
revisions, such as those typically made in response to the release of the President￿s budget), one 
may derive a roughly semiannual series of forecast changes in revenues and expenditures.  In the 
past, I have used the resulting series to evaluate CBO￿s forecasting record, focusing primarily on 
the revisions not related to policy (Auerbach 1994, 1999), but also focusing, as here, on the 
determinants of policy, albeit at an annual frequency (Auerbach 2000). 
  Data from CBO forecast revisions are available since summer, 1984, as the pattern of 
semiannual forecasts begins with the winter, 1984 Budget Outlook.  For each observation, I   7
measure the policy change with respect revenues, expenditures
6, or their difference￿the 
surplus￿as the discounted sum of policy changes adopted during the interval for the current and 
subsequent five fiscal years (relative to each year￿s corresponding measure of potential GDP), 
with the six weights normalized to sum to 1
7.  Based on a simple goodness-of-fit measure (the 
regression￿s
2 R ) in a search over different values, I choose a discount factor of .5, meaning that 
each succeeding fiscal year￿s policy change is accorded half the weight of the previous one.
8  To 
facilitate comparison with the results in Table 1, I relate these fiscal policy changes to lagged 
values of the full-employment GDP gap from the prior quarter, and the previous fiscal year 
surplus.
9  Table 2 presents the results of these regressions, for the three dependent variables, for 
the full sample period and the first and second halves of the sample period, which approximately 
correspond to the last two subperiods examined in Table 1. 
  The results in Table 2 are generally consistent with those in Table 1.  Over the full 
sample period, both the GDP gap and the budget surplus exert a significant, negative impact on 
surplus-enhancing policy actions, with both revenues and outlays responding in a consistent 
manner.  The strength and precision of the effects are smaller for the overall surplus during the 
first half of the sample period than in the second, as was the case for these two periods in Table 
1.  As can be seen from the breakdown between revenues and outlays, though, this strengthened 
                                                 
6 I exclude from changes in expenditures induced changes in debt service, as these are attributable to both revenue 
and expenditure policy changes and a breakdown is not available. 
7 Because policy revisions between the winter and summer take effect starting midway through the current fiscal 
year, I reduce the weight on the current fiscal year by one-half and increase weights on subsequent years 
correspondingly.  That is, if δ is the discount factor, the weights applied to revisions between summer and winter are 
x, xδ, xδ
2,￿, xδ




5), where x and y are determined so that the weights for the six fiscal years sum to 1. 
8 The results for alternative discount factors, ranging from .1 to .67, are qualitatively similar to those presented in 
Table 2. 
9 I use the annual surplus measure, rather than the quarterly NIPA surplus used in Table 1, to maintain consistency 
with the surplus, revenue and expenditure policy measures here, which are based on the actual federal budget.   8
responsiveness since 1993 is due to behavior on the revenue side, as outlay responses are 
relatively similar (and not statistically different) during the two halves of the sample period. 
  The responsiveness of revenues to the budget surplus since 1993 is quite consistent with 
the pattern of major tax legislation, with the tax increase of 1993, occurring at a time of large 
budget deficits, being followed by a small tax cut in 1997, when the deficit was much smaller, 
and a large tax cut in 2001, when the budget was in surplus.  What is, perhaps, more surprising is 
that this same increased sensitivity does not also show up on the outlay side.  After a period of 
effective downward pressure on discretionary spending, associated with the multi-year spending 
caps initiated by the Budget Enforcement Act in 1990 and extended by legislation in 1993 and 
1997, the decade closed with a surge in ￿emergency￿ spending in 1999 and 2000, meant to 
override the spending caps, with the caps simply being ignored thereafter, even before the post-
September 11 surge in national security spending. 
Part of the explanation for this lack of the expected empirical finding may be the 
behavior of entitlement spending, which has been growing in importance over the years, or the 
conventions used to determine when spending policy has ￿changed.￿  This is typically a more 
difficult task than is faced on the revenue side, where policy changes primarily just track actual 
legislative changes.  To address each of these concerns, I consider, in Table 3, the behavior of 
discretionary spending over the years.  These data are available since fiscal year 1962, so the first 
observed change in fiscal year spending is for 1963.  The table relates actual year-to-year 
changes in discretionary spending to the prior year￿s GDP gap
10 and budget surplus, all relative 
to full-employment GDP.  This exercise has two advantages over the examination of outlays in 
Table 2: it focuses only on discretionary spending, and considers actual spending changes, rather 
                                                 
10 The results were similar using the GDP gap for the last quarter prior to the fiscal year, rather than for the previous 
fiscal year.   9
than changes in forecast spending.  It also has the disadvantages of being at an annual frequency, 
making an evaluation of countercyclical responses problematic, and including changes in 
spending that might be the automatic result of cyclical factors.  This second problem should not 
be a major concern, though, given that the focus is on discretionary spending. 
For the full sample, in Table 3￿s first column, the coefficients of the GDP gap and the 
budget surplus both have the predicted sign, but both are small and neither is estimated precisely.  
In all specifications and time periods, the GDP gap was quite insignificant, suggesting a weak 
relationship at the annual frequency.  Thus, the remaining columns present estimates excluding 
this variable, for the full sample period and three subperiods, the last two, 1984-92 and 1993-
2001, corresponding to the two recent sample periods examined in Tables 1 and 2.  The results in 
these columns do suggest a recent increase in the responsiveness of discretionary spending to the 
budget surplus, with this relationship being statistically significant since 1993.  But, with only 
nine observations for this period, one should not make too much of these results.  There may, 
indeed, have been a recent breakdown in fiscal discipline, but it is difficult to quantify the 
importance of this phenomenon using standard statistical techniques. 
Summary: How Active Has Policy Been? 
  The results presented thus far are subject to a collection of empirical limitations, which 
have been discussed in the context of their presentation.  But, taken together, they suggest that 
fiscal policy has been responsive both to cyclical factors and conditions of fiscal balance during 
recent decades.  The cyclical responsiveness may be something of a surprise, given a general 
perception that attempts at countercyclical fiscal policy have been poorly timed.  Indeed, one can 
cite instances in which timing has been poor, but there are other cases, for example the advance 
tax reduction checks sent during the late summer of 2001, when fiscal changes occurred at the   10
right time, even if, as seems likely for the 2001 tax cut, the countercyclical thrust occurred by 
coincidence at least as much as by design. 
  Still, the magnitude and timing of discretionary responses is only part of the story 
concerning the efficacy of fiscal policy as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization.  An important 
additional step involves the link from fiscal changes to behavioral responses, an issue about 
which there has been much recent debate and to which I return below.  Also, the automatic 
responses of the budget to the economic cycle, purged from consideration above in order to 
measure the strength of discretionary policy actions, are nonetheless a component of stabilization 
policy and worthy of consideration, particularly if skepticism remains about the viability of 
discretionary policy.  I turn to this issue next. 
Automatic Stabilizers 
  As economic activity fluctuates, so does federal spending and, especially, federal tax 
revenues.  Traditionally, these fiscal changes have been seen as automatic stabilizers, stimulating 
aggregate demand as income falls and reigning in demand and income rises.  But changes in the 
composition of revenues and spending over the postwar period have been substantial.  What 
impact have these changes had on the strength of automatic stabilizers in the United States? 
  One method of measuring the strength of automatic stabilizers is to relate the gap 
between the full-employment surplus and the unadjusted surplus to the contemporaneous gap 
between GDP and full employment GDP.  The coefficient of this relationship indicates the 
magnitude of the response of the surplus to GDP that is embodied in the CBO￿s calculation of 
the full-employment surplus.  For the full sample of quarterly data used above in Table 1, this 
coefficient (in a regression not shown) is .350, indicating that fluctuations in the federal budget 
surplus are equal in magnitude (and of opposite sign) to around one-third of contemporaneous   11
output fluctuations.  One can also look at the coefficient for individual years to see how this 
relationship has changed over time.  As these annual estimates are somewhat unstable, one can 
get some idea of the evolution of the coefficient by looking at a five-year weighted moving 
average of individual year estimates.  This series of smoothed coefficients is shown in Figure 1.
11  
The figure shows fluctuations in the relationship over time, but no obvious trend, other than 
perhaps a drop from the high values of the 1950s.  But this approach based on aggregate 
measures of the output and surplus gaps does not allow one to determine whether these 
fluctuations relate to actual changes in the tax structure or automatic spending rules or to the 
position in the cycle or other factors for which one might wish to control.  To learn more, it is 
helpful to use a more micro-level approach, estimating how, based on tax and spending rules, the 
liabilities of taxpayers and the level of government spending would have changed in each year in 
response to a change in output. 
  Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) used this latter approach to estimate the impact of output 
fluctuations on individual tax payments.  Figure 2 updates the main results of that study, using 
the same methodology with minor adjustments and extended to include later years.  The figure 
includes calculations for even years between 1960 and 1966, and every year thereafter through 
1997.
12  For each year, the calculation is based on that year￿s NBER TAXSIM model based on a 
file of individual income tax returns, using a ￿tax calculator￿ to estimate the impact on tax 
liability of changes in tax-return components of income and deductions.  To calculate the value 
for a particular year, one carries out a hypothetical experiment in which all income and income-
related deduction items on each tax return in that year are increased by 1 percent, meant to simulate 
                                                 
11 The moving average weights are (1/9, 2/9, 1/3, 2/9, 1/9); the figure also excludes 1991, because of the anomalies 
associated with Operation Desert Storm.  
12 I am extremely grateful to Dan Feenberg for providing these estimates and those presented below in Figure 3.   12
a 1-percent change in aggregate income spread neutrally across the population.  Then, all the 
individual tax changes are added together and divided by the sum of assumed income changes for 
that year.  The result is the ratio of the aggregate change in taxes to the aggregate change in income. 
  The first series of Figure 2 presents estimates of this ratio for the income tax, excluding 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  We might expect this ratio to have fallen during the 
1960s and 1970s, with the general decline (at least until the 1990s) of top marginal tax rates 
associated with major legislation in 1964, 1981, and 1986.  However, the two years in which the 
ratio is highest are 1980 and 1981.  The explanation lies in the high inflation of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, with bracket creep (not eliminated from the tax system until 1985) pushing 
taxpayers into higher brackets.  The trend reverses beginning with the 1981 tax cut, as the ratio 
declines gradually into the early-1990s.  
  The second series in Figure 2 repeats the exercise of the first series, but holds the 
distribution of income constant at that of the 1980 tax year, to determine whether changes in the 
responsiveness of the tax system over time are associated with the well-documented shifts in the 
income distribution.  One implements this hypothetical experiment by applying the tax law for each 
respective year to the 1980 sample, with incomes and income-related deductions adjusted to reflect 
the ratio of that year￿s aggregate adjusted gross income to the adjusted gross income for 1980.  We 
might expect this series to exhibit less sensitivity to the cycle in recent years by giving less weight 
to income in higher marginal tax brackets, but the impact of this adjustment is trivial. 
  The third series in the figure is a reprise of the first, with varying income distribution, but 
now the EITC and payroll tax are added.  Adding the EITC alone (not shown) has no effect until its 
1975 enactment, and a very small effect for the remainder of the period, never adding more than 1 
percentage point to the overall response for the aggregate taxpaying population considered in this   13
figure.  The payroll tax adjustment accounts for only the employee portion, consistent with the 
assumption that the fluctuation in before-tax income does not affect the relative incidence of the 
payroll tax on employer and employee.
13  The effect of the payroll tax over time incorporates two 
factors, both of which increase its magnitude.  First, the payroll tax has risen over time.  Second, the 
rapidly rising payroll tax ceiling has made more taxpayers subject to the payroll tax on marginal 
income changes.  Overall, the payroll tax increases the tax response substantially, particularly in 
later years, when it accounts for roughly one-sixth of the overall tax response. 
  The final series shown in Figure 2 takes into account the indirect effects of inflation on tax 
payments.  The existence of a short-run Phillips curve implies that a decline in the rate of economic 
activity, as represented by a rise in the unemployment rate, will be associated with a fall in the 
inflation rate.  As discussed above, inflation raised the real value of taxes paid before 1985, so a 
reduction in the rate of inflation would have decreased this effect, adding to the stabilizing impact of 
the tax system.  This effect is incorporated in the calculation by assuming that the same uniform 1-
percent shock to real income induces a 0.5-percent shock to the price level, for a total increase in 
each individual￿s nominal income of 1.5 percent. The impact of this additional effect is, as expected, 
to raise the tax response in the years prior to 1985. 
  Regardless of which of the series in Figure 2 that one considers, 1981 stands as the year in 
which the individual tax system absorbed the highest share of marginal income changes.  The 
payroll tax imparts an upward trend from the early 1980s on, while the lack of indexing raises 
values for the period prior to 1985.  The overall picture is one of very little net change over the full 
period, as the effects of particular changes have tended to cancel each other out.  The tax response in 
1997 is roughly what it was in 1960. 
                                                 
13 In principle, the change in the employer portion should also act as a cushion, but the impact would be more 
indirect, akin to that of other business tax payments.   14
  These results offer a somewhat different pattern than those in Figure 1, although that figure 
also shows a relative peak around 1981, a rise in the early 1990s, and relatively little trend in 
responsiveness over time.  One important source of the difference between the figures is coverage:  
the personal income and payroll taxes covered in Figure 2 represent the most important automatic 
stabilizers in the United States, but there are other components that are omitted.  Figure 1 covers the 
business and excise taxes excluded from calculations for Figure 2, as well as expenditure side 
responses, notably unemployment compensation.  Also, the data used to produce Figure 1 take into 
account changes in the size of the taxpaying population, while those used for Figure 2 do not. These 
differences explain why the fiscal responses in Figure 2 are smaller than those in Figure 1
14, and 
may also explain differences in year-to-year movements.  Still, both figures suggest that the 
potential role of the fiscal system as an automatic stabilizer is not markedly different than it was 
decades ago.   
The magnitude of these automatic fiscal adjustments, though, indicates only a potential 
for stabilization. The actual impact on aggregate demand of these fiscal changes, like the impact 
of the discretionary changes discussed above, depends on behavioral responses, in this case of 
household consumption expenditures.  There has been considerable discussion in the literature 
about the responsiveness of households to temporary tax changes, starting with the recognition 
that consumption responses to temporary changes should be smaller than those to permanent 
changes￿perhaps extremely small￿among households with long-term planning horizons. 
Indeed, Shapiro and Slemrod (2001) found in a survey that a small minority of 
households (22 percent) planned to spend the advance tax refunds sent in 2001.  On the other 
hand, econometric studies of responses to predictable changes in social security taxes and tax 
                                                 
14 Figure 1 presents tax offsets as a share of GDP, while those in Figure 2 are relative to the tax-return concept of 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), which is about 60 percent of GDP.  Thus, an offset in Figure 2 represents an absolute 
response that is about 60 percent the size of an equal percentage offset in Figure 1.   15
refunds (Parker 1999 and Souleles 1999, respectively) find a larger consumption response, and a 
still larger consumption response￿as high as 90 percent￿has been estimated for the phased-in 
Reagan tax cuts of the early 1980s (Souleles 2002). The data used for these studies typically are 
inadequate to determine whether the consumption response would be different for the high-
income individuals who pay such a large share of income taxes and hence would bear a large 
share of tax fluctuations.  One might expect a much lower response among this group than 
among the general population, if liquidity constraints were causing the large consumption 
response.  But the literature has not provided a strong link between excess consumption 
sensitivity and liquidity constraints, nor has it provided clear evidence of a smaller consumption 
response at higher incomes.  Thus, although theory suggests that the overall impact on 
consumption could be substantially less than the automatic tax adjustments shown in Figure 2, 
some recent estimates indicate large consumption responses.  But the reasons for such large 
estimated responses are not well understood, and hence it is unclear whether they would also 
apply to changes in tax payments induced by cyclical fluctuations.
15 
However, there is another potential way in which the tax system can act as an automatic 
stabilizer that has generally been overlooked.  Automatic stabilizers have typically been 
conceived in relation to aggregate demand but, to the extent that employment levels are also 
determined by labor supply conditions, a tax system with rates rising with respect to income might 
also serve to stabilize output.  Falling output, in reducing marginal tax rates, could encourage 
greater labor supply, with rising output and marginal tax rates having the opposite effect.  Moreover, 
the temporary nature of the change in income, which works against the effectiveness of demand-
                                                 
15 Kniesner and Ziliak (2002) come closer to answering this question by estimating a large consumption response 
directly to variations in individual disposable income.  However, they do not estimate the response to tax payments 
separately, and the variations in disposable income they consider are conditional on aggregate consumption and 
hence purged of cyclical movements.   16
side stabilization, reinforces the supply-side impact.  If leisure is a normal good, permanent 
increases in the after-tax wage have an income effect that discourages labor supply and works 
against the substitution effect of the wage change.  But this offsetting income effect is largely absent 
from temporary changes. 
How large an effect might such marginal tax rate changes have? If we focus only on first-
round effects (i.e., ignoring subsequent effects of the induced increase in labor supply on the 
before-tax wage and marginal tax rate), the net stabilization effect will equal the product of two 
terms: the impact of the initial change in output on the after-tax wage rate though the changing 
marginal tax rate, and the change in labor income from the induced labor supply response.  As 
shown in Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), this product is roughly equal to the product of the 
change in the marginal tax rate with respect to a unit proportional change in income, dt/d ln Y, 
and a relevant labor supply elasticity, sayη, that may be relatively large, reflecting not only the 
absence of an income effect but also the possibility of intertemporal labor substitution. 
Figure 3 presents estimates of the impact of income changes on marginal tax rates, 
averaged over the population in proportion to labor income.  Like the series in Figure 2, these are 
extensions of results presented in Auerbach and Feenberg (2000).  The series in the figure 
correspond to two of those in Figure 2, for the income tax alone without the EITC, and for the 
income tax with the EITC plus the payroll tax.  As one would expect, the patterns in this figure 
are similar to those in Figure 2, with the sensitivity of marginal tax rates peaking around 1981, 
when marginal rates peaked, falling thereafter and again after 1986, as a result of the legislated 
flattening of the marginal rate distributions in those years.  The EITC effect (not shown 
separately from that of the payroll tax) is small, slightly reducing the marginal tax rate sensitivity 
(due to individuals passing out of the phase-out range with rising income). The impact of the   17
payroll tax is more significant and counter to its impact on the demand side.  Here, it reduces the 
tax system￿s impact; around the payroll tax ceiling, the marginal tax rate falls sharply as income 
rises.
1617   
Overall, the potential stabilizing impact through marginal tax rate changes has fallen 
considerably since the early 1980s.  Even now, though, the implied effect is about .07 times the 
labor supply elasticity, potentially close in magnitude to the consumption response just 
estimated.  Thus, to the extent that cyclical fluctuations in employment are an equilibrium 
phenomenon￿generated not simply by changes in labor demand, but by interactions of supply 
and demand￿one should not ignore the role of marginal tax rates in stabilizing output. 
  In summary, automatic stabilizers have long been suggested to be an effective tool for 
overcoming the lags of discretionary policy.  According to the traditional approach to estimating 
the tax system￿s capacity for automatic stabilization, the U.S. tax system is roughly as effective 
as in the 1960s, though less effective than it was two decades ago.  But there is an additional 
issue that must be confronted regarding automatic stabilizers, that their ability to stimulate 
aggregate demand depends on the transmission of temporary after-tax income shocks to 
consumption.  Despite recent contributions to the literature, the strength of this consumption 
effect is still not clear.  On the other hand, there may be an impact on the supply side that has 
typically been ignored, that provides a stronger impact on output, particularly in the case of 
temporary tax shocks.  The relative importance of automatic stabilizers on the demand and 
supply sides remains to be determined. 
                                                 
16 The measured effect may be somewhat overstated, because it does not take into account the present value of 
benefits generated by marginal payroll taxes.  But this offset would be far from complete for households near the 
payroll tax ceiling, given the progressivity and other features of the benefit formula. 
17 As discussed in Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) incorporating the added change in nominal income due to inflation 
magnifies the measured effect before 1985.   18
How Effective Has Fiscal Policy Been? 
Above, I presented evidence on the cyclical responsiveness of discretionary fiscal policy, 
as measured by changes in spending and tax revenues effected through explicit policy changes.  
This evidence suggests that these fiscal changes have been countercyclical, making them 
potentially helpful to the cause of macroeconomic stabilization.  Indeed, the cyclical 
responsiveness appears to have increased during the past decade. 
As the discussion of the previous section on automatic stabilizers reminds us, though, one 
must look beyond simple changes in revenues and spending to the impacts on output.  This is 
especially important on the revenue side, for revenue changes, in themselves, have no impact on 
GDP￿they work only through the behavioral responses they elicit.  In terms of household 
consumption￿the main response considered thus far￿the primary issue is how large the 
response will be.  But, for the other component of private domestic spending￿investment￿the 
issues are more complicated. 
Stabilization and Investment 
Although spending on durable investment goods may depend to a certain extent on 
current after-tax cash flow, it also depends on expectations of future profitability and, 
importantly, future tax policy.  The issue of intertemporal substitution, raised above in the 
discussion of the potential labor supply response, is even more relevant here, in considering the 
purchase of long-lived durable investment goods.  Changes￿or expected changes￿in the 
effective price of durable goods potentially can exert a powerful impact on investment spending, 
in a manner that is not well captured by concurrent changes in business tax collections. 
A good illustration of this distinction is afforded by the 2002 stimulus bill￿s change in 
investment incentives.  The primary change was the introduction of expensing (instead of regular   19
depreciation) for 30 percent of purchases of investment goods with tax lifetimes of 20 years or 
less, for a period of three years.  As a form of accelerated depreciation, this policy, mechanically, 
would have a larger revenue effect in the short run than in the long run, even if it were enacted 
permanently.  The additional deductions for future investment would be offset by the smaller 
deductions on prior investment that had already been partially expensed.  Thus, the annual 
revenue losses would not provide an accurate picture of the tax incentives for capital investment, 
which would remain constant after enactment.  As enacted, though, the provision is more 
complicated to analyze, for it makes capital less attractive to have after three years, but also 
encourages a shift in the timing of investment to occur within the three-year window.  The 
plausibility of the provision￿s three-year life span is also at issue in determining whether firms 
treat this ￿temporary￿ incentive as permanent.  Actual behavior will reflect expectations about 
the future, not statutory language, and the past practice of countercyclical investment incentives 
will influence the formation of these expectations. 
  The role of current tax provisions and expectations can be described using the standard 
Hall-Jorgenson user of cost of capital, which provides a measure of the required gross, before-tax 
return to capital and hence a measure of the incentive to use capital in production.  For a constant 
tax system, the user cost is: 
 





















where p is the price of output, q is the price of new capital goods, ρ is the nominal discount rate, 
δ is the exponential rate at which capital actually depreciates, k is the investment tax credit, τ is 
the corporate tax rate, and z is the present value of depreciation allowances per dollar of capital   20
purchased.  According to this theory, taxation affects the incentive to invest in a straightforward 
manner, with increases in the corporate tax rate raising the cost of capital (assuming that z<1) 
and increases in the investment tax credit or the present value of depreciation allowances 
lowering the cost of capital.  If one modifies the assumptions to incorporate changes in tax 
policy, the user cost of capital becomes (see Auerbach 1983):  
 














































where Γ equals the sum of the investment tax credit and the present value of tax savings from 
depreciation deductions.
18 
According to expression (2), the price of capital goods is effectively the underlying price, 
q, multiplied by a factor that accounts for the tax benefits associated with the purchase of capital, 
Γ.  The presence of the additional term on the right-hand side of (2) means that there are now 
two ways in which tax policy may affect investment.  First, as already discussed, it can affect the 
overall level of desired capital, given a constant tax regime.  Second, if the regime is expected to 
change, it may encourage firms to alter the timing of their capital purchases.  Indeed, a change 
such as the expected elimination of an investment tax credit has a powerful effect on the user 
cost as computed from expression (2), for it induces a huge capital gain at the time of the credit￿s 
elimination. 
To study these timing effects, though, a model that assumes instantaneous capital stock 
adjustment is inadequate.  Theoretical models that incorporate adjustment costs commonly 
                                                 
18 This sum equals k+τz if τ is constant over time.  If τ is expected to change over time, then the present value of tax 
savings from depreciation deductions is not the simple product of the current value of τ and the present value of 
depreciation deductions, z.   21
assume that the cost of adjustment rises at an increasing rate with the level of capital 
expenditures, implying that it is desirable for the firm to spread the expenditures over time.  
Moreover, expectations of future changes in the incentive to use capital in production lead to 
immediate changes in investment, in order to minimize the adjustment costs incurred in closing 
the gap between the current and future desired capital stocks. 
As shown in Auerbach (1989) and Auerbach and Hassett (1992), optimal investment 
behavior in the presence of convex adjustment costs, which gives rise to Tobin￿s q theory of 
investment (e.g., Hayashi 1982), may also be characterized by a partial adjustment investment 
process in which the desired capital stock at date t varies inversely with the weighted average of 
the current and expected future user costs of capital based on expression (2): 
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where the weights, wi, sum to unity and decline exponentially, at a rate that is inversely related to 
the size of adjustment costs; the more sluggish the investment response, the more the future 
matters.  
Expression (3) for the weighted sum of user costs has some straightforward implications.  
If the user cost suddenly changed today￿for example, because of a change in tax law designed 
to deliver the economy from recession￿and this change were expected to last indefinitely, then 
the weighted average is simply the new current value (because the weights add to unity).  
However, if today￿s change in the user cost is not expected to persist￿for example, because the 
change in tax law is expected to be temporary￿then the user cost relevant for current investment 
must reflect this anticipation.  Generally, this will encourage even more current investment than 
if the incentive were expected to be permanent.   22
The possible effects of temporary incentives can be illustrated with the new U.S. law.  
Table 4 summarizes the immediate fiscal stimulus for a representative asset for a variety of 
assumptions about the weight placed on future capital costs and the permanence of the tax 
change.  The weights on future capital costs reflect a plausible range, based on the estimates in 
Auerbach and Hassett (1992).  As the table suggests, there is a wide range of possible effects, 
depending on the technology of investment adjustment and the nature of expectations; and it is 
reasonable to assume that expectations would account for more than the statutory language, 
given the degree of policy activism in the past. 
In a regression based on annual data for the period 1953-85, Auerbach and Hines (1988) 




, was significantly affected by 
the unemployment rate, the rate of GNP growth, and the real interest rate.  Some of the signs 
were consistent with countercyclical policy timing, but others were not, making the net 
stabilizing impact unclear.  Further, one must also take into account the impact that such frequent 
policy changes had on investment in periods when stimulus was not being applied￿when the 
expectation of an investment incentive might have depressed investment.  Based on their 
empirical estimates of investment behavior, Auerbach and Hassett (1992) concluded that, over 
the period 1953-88, actual tax policy had destabilized business fixed investment.  The period 
since then, until this year, has been one of quietude with respect to investment-oriented changes 
in the law, but not with respect to proposed changes, including a similar provision to that enacted 
this year proposed by the first President Bush in 1992, and the possibility of an incremental 
investment tax credit floated during the first year of the Clinton administration.  Presumably, 
some of the investment fluctuations of the past decade represented reactions to tax changes that 
never occurred.   23
While discretionary fiscal policy has proved problematic for stimulating investment, 
there are also problems associated with automatic stabilizers.  As portrayed by the neoclassical 
investment theory, forward-looking investment behavior need not respond strongly to current 
cash-flow conditions.  This prediction remains controversial, as the literature￿motivated by 
theories of capital market imperfections and asymmetric information￿continues to debate the 
importance of current cash-flow conditions for investment.  To whatever extent cash flow does 
matter, income tax fluctuations, especially fluctuations in the corporate income tax, can cushion 
investment fluctuations, for they rise and fall with current profitability.  But there are important 
limits to this cushion on the down side imposed by tax law asymmetries, notably the limits on the 
deductibility of losses and the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). 
The inability of corporations to get refunds for losses can loom very large in recessions.  
During the deep recession in the early 1980s, for example, Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) found 
that roughly one-fifth (weighted by assets) of the non-financial corporate sector was constrained 
in this manner, with an even larger number of firms not fully able to utilize investment tax 
credits for which some investment qualified at the time.  Such restrictions have a mixed effect on 
the forward-looking incentive to invest, as the inability to deduct depreciation and other up-front 
incentives today is offset by the possibility that profits will be shielded by future losses.  But, for 
cash-constrained firms, the negative effect is clear.  Thus, the 2002 stimulus package also 
included a temporary, two-year provision that extended the number of prior years to which 
current losses could be ￿carried back￿ to offset past profits and get an immediate deduction for 
losses. 
The corporate AMT has an effect similar to the limit on losses.  It is more likely to bind 
(i.e., exceed a firm￿s regular tax liability) in periods of low profitability, as a firm￿s AMT   24
liability is less sensitive to profit fluctuations than its regular tax liability.  Like the limit on 
losses, the AMT represents a deviation from symmetric taxation that reduces cash flows during 
periods of low profitability.  There are other asymmetries present in the tax code, working in the 
same direction, such as the limit on the use of foreign tax credits. 
These various tax law asymmetries￿which may have little economic justification and in 
any event have generally been enacted without consideration of economic effects￿have, as the 
2002 legislation illustrates, transferred a potential automatic stabilizer into the realm of 
discretionary policy.  As the limits of discretionary policy are recognized, it certainly makes 
sense to give some serious thought to reforming these provisions permanently. 
Measuring Fiscal Policy￿s Quantitative Effects 
  Taking account of all the channels through which discretionary fiscal policy has operated, 
is it possible to measure how effective it has been? In a recent investigation using time series 
methods, Blanchard and Perotti (1999) find that discretionary fiscal policy ￿works￿ in the sense 
that positive innovations to government spending increase subsequent output, as do negative 
innovations to tax revenues.  In particular, tax reductions increase consumption.  This means that 
discretionary policy could work, in that it has some effect on output and its components. 
Also using time series methods, Romer and Romer (1994) conclude that actual 
discretionary fiscal policy worked in the right direction, which is consistent with the regressions 
above showing that discretionary policy has responded to the GDP gap.  But they also estimate 
that discretionary fiscal policy￿s overall impact was minimal, compared to that of monetary 
policy.  They infer from the size and timing of automatic fiscal stabilizers that these have had a 
more important impact than discretionary policy, but it is difficult to estimate the impact of 
automatic stabilizers directly, precisely because they are directly tied to output fluctuations.  That   25
is, while there may have been ￿natural experiments￿ for discretionary policy that can be used to 
estimate such policy￿s economic impacts, automatic stabilizers are, by their nature, driven by 
output fluctuations, so we will see little independent variation in them. 
  As discussed above, the current level of tax revenues is an inadequate summary measure 
of the expansionary thrust of fiscal policy.  Even adjusting for the cycle, revenues can rise or fall 
as a consequence of extraneous factors (such as changes in the income distribution), and their 
composition and future path should also affect current consumption and investment decisions.  
Thus, estimates that cyclically adjusted tax revenues have tended to fall with increases in the 
output gap are not inconsistent with the conclusion that discretionary tax policy has destabilized 
investment, and estimates that discretionary policy has had a weak overall effect on output may 
reflect a combination of negative and positive impacts.  Taken together, the evidence suggests 
that discretionary fiscal policy has effects but leaves us with little evidence that these effects 
have provided a significant contribution to economic stabilization, if in fact they have worked in 
the right direction at all. 
Discretionary Fiscal Policy and the Long-Run Budget Constraint 
  The review above has emphasized that the efficacy of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool 
depends both on the government￿s ability to time policy changes and on the impact of these 
changes on aggregate activity.  For consumption and investment, the impact of policy on current 
activity depends on expectations about the future as well.  Tax cuts perceived to be temporary 
may undercut consumption responses; temporary investment incentives may work in the 
opposite direction, strengthening the immediate response (but also, potentially, weakening prior 
investment).  As yet, I have not discussed how the fiscal environment may influence these 
expectations about the future.  Recent contributions to the theoretical literature, and indeed   26
recent policy arguments, have emphasized the importance of long-run considerations, suggesting 
that the scope for expansionary fiscal policy may be limited when long-run fiscal constraints are 
significant. 
  The government￿s long-run budget constraint is derived from the annual identity relating 
the budget surplus to the gap between revenues and spending plus the restriction that government 
debt cannot forever grow faster than the interest rate.   This constraint may be written: 
 


























where Bt is the ratio of end-of-year national debt to GDP in the current year t, 
p
s S is the primary 
surplus in year s as a share of that year￿s GDP, and r and g are the interest rate and the rate of 
economic growth, assumed for simplicity here to be constant.  Under normal circumstances, r>g, 
meaning that it is not possible to ￿grow our way out of debt￿ passively by waiting for growth to 
provide the revenues needed for debt service; a higher level of national debt requires a 
compensating higher present value of future primary surpluses.  This constraint always applies to 
government policy, whether or not it holds for current law.  If expression (4) indicates an 
imbalance under current policy, this simply means that current policy is not sustainable. 
  The current state of fiscal policy, relative to one of fiscal balance, can influence the 
efficacy of discretionary policy in two ways.  First, it can influence current policy, discouraging 
further expansion in the face of a preexisting fiscal imbalance, or encouraging it when the 
government￿s fiscal position appears more responsible.  The estimates in Tables 1-3 above 
suggest that policy follows this pattern, at least if the previous budget surplus as a share of GDP 
provides some indication of the government￿s fiscal position.  (I return to this question of   27
measurement below.)  Second, the government￿s fiscal position provides information about the 
set of feasible future policies.  A situation of extreme imbalance, for example, suggests that a 
substantial reduction in spending, a substantial increase in tax revenues, or both will be needed in 
the future.
19  Thus, a large current tax cut may have a less powerful impact on current 
consumption, if households view it as unsustainable and likely to be followed very quickly by a 
tax increase. 
  Indeed, many contributions to literature, surveyed recently by Giavazzi et al. (2000), 
have suggested reasons why a loosening of fiscal policy, adopted under such conditions of fiscal 
duress, may actually have contractionary economic effects.  Normally, we would expect tax cuts 
to have positive wealth effects, increasing current consumption demand.  Even recognizing the 
government￿s long-run budget constraint, which requires these tax cuts to be paid for by 
offsetting future policies, current consumers with finite horizons would expect some of the 
burden to be placed on future generations, leaving a net positive wealth effect for those alive 
today.  As already discussed, the size of this wealth effect might be small, if the tax cut is 
assumed to be temporary. 
But the wealth effect might even be negative, if the government must rely on very 
distortionary future taxes to recoup today￿s revenue loss, or if reaching some critical debt level or 
degree of fiscal imbalance triggers a crisis or a precipitous increase in tax burdens.  In both 
instances, the full induced cost of future tax increases more than offsets the benefits of 
immediate tax cuts, even for current generations, who are then induced to curtail consumption 
and save more in preparation for the hard times to come.  A similar logic applies to the effects of 
                                                 
19 Included among the range of possible tax revenues are the implicit taxes on the holders of government assets 
associated with inflation￿through seignorage and erosion of nominal debt￿and outright default.   28
government expenditures, and there is some international evidence from the output responses to 
fiscal policy that mechanisms like these may be at work (Perotti 1999). 
  The possibility of fiscal policy having expansionary effects certainly has come up in 
debates about U.S. fiscal policy in the 1980s and 1990s.  The strong performance of the U.S. 
economy in the 1990s was often attributed by the Clinton administration to responsible fiscal 
adjustments, including the tax increase of 1993 and the extension of discretionary spending caps 
in 1993 and 1997.  A common view appears to have evolved in policy discussions of 1990s fiscal 
policy that the positive effects worked through interest rate adjustments, the reduced crowding 
out and greater confidence in government inducing lower interest rates, which then spurred 
interest-sensitive private demand. 
  There is a long-running debate over the extent to which fiscal contractions actually do 
reduce interest rates significantly.  But, whatever one￿s perspective on this debate, it is unclear 
how the theoretical literature explaining why fiscal contractions might expand output can be 
translated into the popular view of recent events that sees this expansion of output as occurring 
through a decline in  interest rates.  In particular, a fall in interest rates is not typically an element 
of the theory of expansionary fiscal contractions, and it is not evident how fiscal contractions 
might lead simultaneously to lower real interest rates and higher aggregate demand and output. 
  As a start, the conflict may be illustrated using a standard IS-LM diagram, as in Figure 
4, with the real interest rate on the vertical axis and output on the horizontal axis.  The standard 
analysis of a fiscal contraction, either through a tax increase or a spending reduction, starts with a 
downward shift in the IS curve from its initial position at IS
0, inducing a decline in aggregate 
demand and a decline in interest rates, with the decline in interest rates serving to cushion the 
decline in aggregate demand via a movement along the new, lower IS curve, labeled IS
1 in the   29
figure.  If the fiscal contraction conveys positive news about the future, this may stimulate 
current private sector demand, causing the downward shift in the IS curve to lessen, as 
represented by the intermediate curve labeled IS
2.  There is no theoretical barrier to the IS curve 
actually shifting upward beyond the original curve, IS
0, if the positive impact on private demand 
is sufficiently strong.  If this happens, then aggregate demand will indeed rise, but so will the 
interest rate, r.  Adding inflation expectations to this basic framework merely deepens the 
problem.  If the fiscal policy reduces the expected inflation rate, it reduces the nominal interest 
rate corresponding to any given real interest rate, thereby increasing money demand and causing 
a leftward-shift in the LM curve, from LM
0 to LM
1.  This will require an even larger increase in 
the real interest rate for aggregate demand to increase. 
  The IS-LM model embodies a variety of restrictive assumptions, of course, but the 
difficulty of generating this combination of interest rate and output movements really just has to 
do with equilibrium in the capital market.  If the demand for funds does not decline, then a fall in 
the real interest rate must be initiated by an increase in the supply of funds.  What mechanism 
can generate this increased supply of funds and an increase in output at the same time? It is hard 
to see this combination as the result of a process beginning on the demand side, which would 
start with a reduction in the supply of funds via an increase in private or government 
consumption. 
On the supply side, there could be an increase in labor supply (perhaps due to the income 
effect associated with expected higher tax payments in the future), which would increase output 
and, possibly, saving, but the increase in employment would tend to increase the productivity of 
capital and hence the demand for capital, too.  The same would be true of a positive productivity 
shock (perhaps in some way associated with the salutary effects of the fiscal policy on economic   30
stability)￿it might increase output and the supply of funds, but it would also increase the 
demand for funds by firms seeking to take advantage of the higher productivity level.  A 
temporary productivity shock would ￿work￿ in that it would increase output and saving as 
households sought to spread the benefits of the temporary shock over the future, but this seems 
rather far afield from what has been envisioned in policy discussions. 
  The analysis here is certainly not definitive, for there are many more scenarios and 
assumptions that a creative mind could employ.  For example, if the fiscal contraction reduced 
the riskiness of future inflation (rather than just the level of expected inflation), this change 
might make long-term bonds relatively less risky than cash, reducing the demand for money and 
shifting the LM curve out in Figure 4, as to the position LM
2.  The result could be an increase in 
output and a decline in real interest rates, indicated by the intersection of this curve and the curve 
labeled IS
2.
20  Or, perhaps, the ￿common wisdom￿ is based on confusion between nominal and 
real interest rates, for it is easier to understand how nominal rates might decline even as output 
increased as a consequence of a fiscal contraction.  Finally, it is possible that a policy of fiscal 
contraction induces expectations of further fiscal contractions in the future, thereby lowering 
long-term interest rates enough to expand current output and short-term interest rates.
21  Thus, 
long-term rates would fall as current output rose, but short-term rates would rise. 
  As this discussion is meant to demonstrate, it is entirely possible that fiscal contractions 
might benefit the economy, and it is also possible that the United States in the 1990s offers us a 
positive demonstration.  But the mechanism by which this is commonly supposed to have 
happened is not easily matched to a clear, compelling economic explanation.  As we contemplate 
                                                 
20 One might test this hypothesis by looking at movements in yields on indexed government bonds, which would not 
benefit from a reduction in inflation risk.  Unfortunately, the United States began issuing indexed bonds only in 
1997, after the Clinton administration￿s fiscal policy had largely been implemented. 
21 This possibility of this combination of effects is demonstrated analytically in Blanchard (1981).   31
fiscal contractions in the future to respond to the major fiscal imbalance that exists, it is 
important to understand not only whether the 1990s fiscal contraction had expansionary effects, 
but also, if so, how this occurred. 
Accounting Conventions and Fiscal Policy 
  Ultimately, government fiscal decisions must conform to the long-run budget constraint, 
but any particular year￿s policies need not, unless a long-run imbalance has precipitated a crisis 
requiring immediate action.  The United States faces a long-term fiscal imbalance, giving the 
trajectory based on its current fiscal polices.  The estimated size of this imbalance has fluctuated 
in the past decade, falling during the late 1990s and rising recently, but the main source of the 
imbalance￿large, unfunded transfer programs, an aging population, and a continuing rise in 
health care spending per capita￿has not changed.  Based on the most recent CBO projections, 
Auerbach et al. (2002) estimate that the current imbalance, expressed as a permanent share of 
GDP by which the primary surplus would need to increase to satisfy expression (4) above, is 
between 4 and 8 percent.  This is an enormous magnitude, larger as a share of GDP than any 
conventionally measured primary deficit during the postwar period. 
  It appears that government policy does respond to measures like the budget surplus, but 
the surplus itself is an extremely arbitrary measure.  The most familiar illustration of this is the 
distinction between the unified federal budget and the budget that excludes ￿off-budget￿ items, 
most significantly the Social Security (OASDI) trust funds.  In all but two recent fiscal years 
(1999 and 2000), the unified budget excluding off-budget items has been in deficit and the 
OASDI trust fund substantially in surplus.  Moreover, as Figure 5 illustrates, the trends of the 
two surpluses are different.  The Social Security trust fund has been growing as a share of GDP 
since it was roughly zero in 1984.   32
  Recognition that the Social Security trust fund is being accumulated to help pay for future 
benefits is now widespread among policy makers.  Recent years￿ legislative machinations have 
given us new and arcane budget concepts like the ￿lock-box￿ in which the Social Security trust 
fund was to have been kept from the clutches of the fiscally irresponsible.  But there is probably 
still not complete understanding how small the Social Security trust fund is relative to the 
unfunded commitments that appear nowhere on the conventional federal balance sheet, or that 
the annual accumulations in the trust fund are swamped by the annual accumulations in this 
implicit but very firm liability. 
There have been attempts to broaden the federal budget presentation to make implicit 
liabilities more explicit.  For example, the official U.S. budget documents released by the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) for fiscal years 1993-95 provided estimates of generational 
accounts, a recently developed and now widely used method of evaluating fiscal conditions.
22  
These presentations showed a substantial fiscal imbalance, represented by large looming burdens 
on future generations.  Both CBO and, to a lesser extent, OMB have begun providing longer-
term budget projections that, like those of the Social Security Trustees reports, show quite clearly 
the unsustainable policy trends. 
Generational accounts and estimates of long-term budget gaps have become more 
familiar over time, but these projections still serve more as background information than as 
direct inputs to the policy process, which continues to rely on current and short-term deficit 
measures and, indeed, has come to rely more mechanically on these measures since the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings legislation of the 1980s setting deficit targets.
23  Given how much attention 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Auerbach et al. (1999). 
23 The primacy of the simple surplus measure is consistent with the fact that more forward-looking measures of the 
budget gap in alternative specifications of the policy equations in Table 2 were less successful in explaining policy 
changes.   33
recent political debates about taxes and federal spending have given to the budget surplus, 
making changes to the ￿official￿ budget surplus, as through inclusion of some measure of 
accumulating liabilities, could have a major impact on policy. 
As an illustration of what such a change might mean, the first column of Table 5 presents 
rough estimates of the size of the implicit liability of the OASDI system at the beginning of each 
year from 1997-2002, based on annual Social Security Trustees reports, other data, and a variety 
of assumptions that are described more fully in the appendix to this paper.  This implicit debt is 
considerably larger than the reported national debt.
24  The change from one year to the next in 
the implicit debt is a measure of the corresponding implicit deficit.  This deficit, shown for each 
year in the table￿s second column, may be broken down into two components, one attributable to 
changes in the base year of the calculation and the other due to changes in population projections 
and economic projections from one year to the next.  For example, the change in the implicit 
liability between 2000 and 2001 is estimated to be $769 billion, of which $798 billion￿slightly 
more than the total implicit deficit￿is attributable to the advance of a year in the date at which 
the calculation is being made.  A small reduction of $29 billion in the implicit deficit is 
attributable to an improvement in the forecast from the 2000 Trustees Report to the 2001 
Trustees Report.  For 2001, the total implicit deficit is estimated to be negative (i.e., there is an 
implicit surplus), because the impact of the base-year shift is more than offset by a substantial 
improvement in the forecast. 
The deficit components attributable to changing forecasts are quite volatile, but the 
components due to base-year changes are not.  These large, positive components reflect the fact 
that a large cohort in the population￿the baby boom generation￿is moving closer and closer to 
                                                 
24 The magnitude of these estimates is roughly consistent with similar calculations for the period through 1997 
presented in Goss (1999).   34
retirement and the receipt of benefits.  The closer in time these benefits are, the higher the 
present value of the liability to pay them.  These annual accumulations in the OASDI debt 
swamp the annual accumulations in the OASDI trust fund, reminding us that, absent a continuing 
trend of improving projections like those of the last two years, a full accrual accounting of the 
OASDI system would show enormous annual deficits.  Adding in the implicit liabilities of the 
Medicare system would substantially amplify this result. 
Just as in the private sector, accounting conventions can have important real effects if the 
underlying information is not fully transparent.  Even though it would directly cause no changes 
in the government￿s underlying liabilities, formally incorporating the accruing obligation to pay 
Social Security and Medicare benefits would convey much more clearly to policy makers and, 
perhaps more importantly, to those to whom policy makers are accountable, that the fiscal 
imbalance is not merely a ￿future￿ problem.  It is hard to imagine that inclusion of deficit 
numbers like those in Table 5 in the annual presentation of the federal budget would not have an 
important impact on fiscal policy decisions. 
Conclusions 
  Recent experience and research suggest a number of conclusions regarding the use and 
efficacy of discretionary fiscal policy: 
(1) In recent years, U.S. discretionary fiscal policy appears to have become more active 
in response to both cyclical conditions and a simple measure of budget balance. 
(2) Considerable uncertainty remains about how large an impact discretionary fiscal 
policy has on output.   35
(3) There is little evidence that discretionary fiscal policy has played an important 
stabilization role during recent decades, both because of the potential weakness of its effects and 
because some of its effects (with respect to investment) have been poorly timed. 
(4) Budgetary pressure may not only affect the fiscal response, but may also weaken the 
efficacy of expansionary fiscal policy if it is adopted.  Conversely, contractionary fiscal policy 
may not restrict activity, and might even have a salutary effect on output.  This possibility may 
be relevant for understanding the impact of fiscal policy in the 1990s, although the mechanism is 
unclear. 
(5) Automatic stabilizers offer an alternative to discretionary fiscal policy.  The automatic 
stabilizers embedded in the fiscal system have experienced little net change since the 1960s and 
have contributed to cushioning cyclical fluctuations.  But the tax system has many attributes that 
weaken its potential role as an automatic stabilizer, particularly with respect to investment. 
(6) The government￿s reported fiscal position, to which fiscal policy appears responsive, 
represents a very poor measure of underlying fiscal balance. 
  These findings suggest the need for continued caution in the use of discretionary policy, 
greater focus on making automatic stabilizers more effective, and the integration of better 
measures of fiscal balance into the discretionary policy process.  And, of course, more research 
on the relevant issues.  36
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Appendix 
  This appendix provides a brief description of the data and methodology used to derive the 
implicit OASDI liability estimates reported in Table 5. 
  For each year from 1997 through 2001, the following procedure is used.  Projected 
annual flows in and out of the OASDI system over a roughly 75-year period are taken from that 
year￿s OASDI Trustees report.  Projections of the male and female population at each age in 
each of these future years is taken from contemporaneous population projections, provided by 
Social Security from unpublished data.
25  The projected taxes and benefits in each future year are 
allocated among cohorts using the tax and benefit profiles by age and sex from Gokhale et al. 
(1999).
26  Then, to obtain an estimate of the OASDI system￿s  ￿closed-group￿ liability￿the 
liability to those already participating￿only the taxes and benefits in each future year that have 
been allocated by this procedure to individuals who are at least 18 years old in the base year are 
counted.  Finally, all of these included tax and benefit flows are discounted back to the base year 
using a nominal discount rate of 6 percent, a long-term discount rate consistent with recent 
Trustees assumptions.  For 2002, the same procedure is used, except that 2001 population 
projections are used because the unpublished population projections for 2002 are not available. 
The deficit for each year equals the next year￿s estimated liability minus that of the 
current year.  The part of this deficit that is attributable to the change in base year is obtained by 
re-estimating the following year￿s debt using the current year￿s projections of flows and 
population. 
                                                 
25 I am grateful to Seung An at the Social Security Administration for providing these data. 
26 If ai is the relative benefit (or tax) profile element for each cohort i (where i ranges over age and sex) and pit 
is cohort i￿s population in year t, then the fraction of year t￿s benefits (or taxes) allocated to a particular cohort j is 
ajpjt/(Σiaipit). 
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